tort with which the leading speech in the majority -that of Lord Atkin -found in favour of Mrs Donoghue. In memorable prose drawing upon the parable of the Good Samaritan, Lord Atkin enunciated the "neighbourhood" principle under which if it was reasonably foreseeable that one's failure to take care would cause injury to another, then one owed that other a duty to take the requisite care, breach of which would give rise to liability in damages. This principle of a duty of care arising from a relationship of "neighbourhood" or, as it is more usually put today, "proximity", has been the basis since of astonishing developments of delictual and tortious liability, going far beyond the simple situation in the original case. A particularly important aspect of the case was the establishment of a duty of care between the manufacturer of a product and the ultimate consumer of that product, a matter on which there has been relatively recent further development under the Consumer Protection Act 1987.
While the Donoghue case held that a manufacturer could be liable to the injured consumer only for failure to take care, the Act makes the manufacturer liable for the injuries caused by the defective product even if there is no fault on his part.
Another subsequent development of interest to this audience is liability for defective construction. Initially Donoghue, a case about moveable property, was not seen as relevant to land and buildings. So in Otto v Bolton 3 in 1936, the Court of Appeal found a builder not liable for the defective ceiling which fell on and injured Mrs Bolton. Famously this approach was over-turned in the 1970s, beginning with the collapse of Mrs Dutton's house; 4 but after a prolonged and agonising debate throughout the 1980s, the House of Lords decided that the duty in respect of defective construction did not extend to enabling the owner of a building to recover for the cost of remedying the defects unless there was a contract to that effect between the parties. Such loss was purely economic, as distinct from the kind of physical injury suffered by Mrs Donoghue, and with some exceptions the law does not allow recovery of such loss.
5
This development can be linked with that of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 in the case where a product causes damage to land or a building. The Act defines a product as any goods, including a product comprised in another product (that is, a component). Producers are liable for damage caused by a defect in the product. A defect occurs when the safety of a product is not such as persons are generally entitled to expect with regard to injury to 3 [1936] property (including land), death or personal injury. Like the common law in this area, therefore, the Act is not concerned with purely economic loss or defects which merely make the building of a lesser quality than it should have. But, further, while land or buildings cannot be "products" for the purposes of the 1987 Act, since they are not recognised as "goods" by the law, the component parts of a building (including concrete) may be, and if relevant damage is found to have been caused to the building by such a component, then there can be liability under the Act. But the property damaged must be of a description such that it is ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption at the time it is damaged. The main example would therefore seem to be a house -although it might be one converted from, say, a warehouse or former office accommodation. The Act also deals with the problem of latent damage where the owner is unaware of the defect caused by the component or product: here damage arises when a person with an interest in the property had knowledge of the material facts about the loss or damage.
In England, Donoghue was also seen as significant because the decision rid the law of the "contract-tort fallacy" which had dominated legal thinking in the area since early in the nineteenth century: A in performing under a contract with B cannot become liable to a third party C for damage caused by that performance. This was a development of the idea that only contracting parties have rights in a contractual situation -the principle of privity of contract.
Thus Mrs Donoghue recovered although she was a third party to the contract between her friend and the café proprietor, and indeed to the contract between the latter and the manufacturer Stevenson under which the contaminated ginger beer had first made its way to the café. Similarly with liability for defective construction and unsafe products: although contracts will generally be involved in the supply of buildings and goods, the contracting parties may well find that their legal responsibilities stretch well beyond the persons with whom they have contracted. In many cases in which a contractual chain … is constructed it may well prove to be inconsistent with an assumption of responsibility which has the effect of, so to speak, short-circuiting the contractual structure so put in place by the parties. … Let me take the … common case of an ordinary building contract, under which main contractors contract with the building owner for the construction of the relevant building, and the main contractor sub-contracts with sub-contractors or suppliers (often nominated by the building owner) for the performance of work or the supply of materials in accordance with standards and subject to terms established in the sub-contract. I put on one side cases in which the sub-contractor causes physical damage to property of the building owner, where the claim does not depend on an assumption of responsibility by the sub-contractor to the building owner; though the sub-contractor may be protected from liability by a contractual exemption clause authorised by the building owner. But if the sub-contracted work or materials do not in the result conform to the required standard, it will not ordinarily be open to the building owner to sue the sub-contractor or supplier direct … For there is generally no assumption of responsibility by the sub-contractor or supplier direct to the building owner, the parties having so structured their relationship that it is inconsistent with any such assumption of responsibility.
But if Junior Books is viewed, not as a negligence case, but as one about third party rights in contracts, there may seem to be less danger of unseating complex contractual allocations of risk. Thus Junior Books might be seen as third parties to the sub-contract between Ogilvie and Veitchi, performance of which by the latter was intended to benefit Junior Books as employers and owners of the property being worked upon; therefore, Junior Books were entitled to sue Veitchi for their defective performance. The attraction of this approach is that it forces examination of the contracts. What standard of performance was contractually required of Veitchi? The flooring could only be defective judged by the standards set expressly or impliedly in the contract. Finally, did the contract manifest an intention to benefit Junior Books, giving them a right to sue for that benefit or damages in lieu? Design, a firm of architects, to design and supervise the construction of a dealership facility.
Strathford (SF), a company affiliated with F, were to lease the premises and operate the dealership after construction was complete. F's contract with HLM provided that the "Owner" was to be "indemnified by HLM against all costs, charges and expenses arising from actions of HLM including but not limited to inaccuracies of design which necessitate corrective or remedial work". "Owners" was defined twice in the contract: (1) as F; (2) as including "F, its affiliates and/or subsidiaries". SF raised an action against HLM in which it averred the appearance in the facility of significant structural defects caused by HLM's negligence (delict). SF also claimed a contractual indemnity as a party included within the definition of "Owner" in the contract, invoking the doctrine of JQT. Lord MacLean refused both claims, holding that HLM did not owe a duty of care in respect of the financial loss suffered by the pursuers, and that in the contract "owner" meant whichever party concluded the contract with HLM and was not intended to create a JQT in favour of SF. But his decision was essentially on the interpretation of the contract before him and not a rejection of the applicability of JQT in a network of construction and development contracts.
Having thus set up the argument for the relevance of JQT linking parties across a network of contracts, I should now note that elsewhere I have expressed some doubts about such an approach to these cases. 12 Such contractual chains, it may well be argued, are meant to keep parties at either end of the chain apart rather than showing an intention to confer a right to sue for the benefit to be conferred by proper performance of the contract. If it were otherwise, the sub-contractor in the typical construction arrangement might be thought to have a direct right to claim payment from the employer, an idea firmly rejected in J B When GH sold a car, the proceeds were lodged in an account held with the Clydesdale Bank (CB). GH and CB had agreed that appropriate transfers should then be made to MB. GH went into receivership indebted to both CB and MB, but with funds sitting in GH's account with CB which had been due to be transferred to MB. Lord Penrose found that the agreement between GH and CB could give a JQT to MB. He rejected CB's main legal argument against this conclusion, which had been to the effect that a JQT could only arise where the third party alone had a substantial interest in the performance, whereas in this case CB clearly also had an interest in ensuring the payment to themselves of the debt which they were owed by GH.
In my view the rejection of this argument was correct.
These cases show that the doctrine of JQT is thriving, and that accordingly the possibility that contractual liability will extend beyond that owed to one's co-contractor must 20 There has been no discussion in these cases of whether the terms of the main contract conferred upon the sub-contractor a right not to be sued for negligence-that is, a negative JQT-or, alternatively, whether the sub-contract's incorporation of the main contract terms and conditions excluded a JQT in favour of the employer. The possibility has been raised by commentators, 21 and it has been observed that "it may not only be conceptually tidier, but practically desirable, … to furnish a contractual solution instead of relying on a delictual solution". 22 Unfortunately, it appears that this approach to the matter will not be put before the House of Lords, although it has the very welcome feature of concentrating on what the contracts say, the intention of the parties, and the contractual allocation of risks. interference with carefully balanced contractual arrangements, including the decision as to who can insure most efficiently, through the uncertain mechanism of fairness, reasonableness and justice expressed through the concepts of proximity and the duty of care.
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II. THE UK AND EUROPEAN FUTURE
In this section of the paper I turn to the UK and European future of the topics so far discussed, bearing in mind the imminent arrival of a Scottish Parliament. One of the things we can safely predict with the Scottish Parliament is the continued existence of Scots private law, since it is specifically included amongst the devolved matters. 24 But the development of that law by the Parliament is nonetheless bound to be strongly influenced, as it is now, by the forces for legal convergence inside the UK-the existence of a single economy unaffected by the border, with people and organisations operating on both sides of the border seeking the famous level playing field.
But another factor in this debate which has so far not attracted nearly enough attention in this country, at least with regard to private and commercial law, is Europe. It is reasonably well-known that Scots law is much more akin to the great European systems-France, Germany, the Netherlands-than English law. Commission which is producing a set of "Principles of European Contract Law". 29 The aim is not necessarily to write a contract code which one day will be adopted across Europe, but rather to provide a scheme of contract rules which can be used for a variety of less grand but nonetheless important purposes. These include university teaching, law reform at national level, gap-filling and development by the courts in national systems, and provision of a set of principles to inform European Union initiatives touching on contract law. An important practical goal is also to provide a system which can be used by parties to cross-border contracts. Where parties are of different nationalities, or the contract requires performance in more than one country, there can be real problems in determining which of the potentially relevant laws is to apply, and in which of the potentially relevant courts disputes are to be settled. A solution to the latter problem is to provide for arbitration or amicable composition, but the problem of choice of law is more difficult. Our hope is that in such cases parties may choose to have their contract governed by our Principles.
Returning to the issues with which this paper is mainly concerned, the draft Principles 1. A third party may require performance of a contractual obligation when his right to do so has been expressly agreed upon between the promisor and the promisee, or when such agreement is to be inferred from the purpose of the contract or the circumstances of the case. The third party need not be identified at the time the agreement is concluded.
2. If the third party renounces the right to performance the right is treated as never having accrued to him.
3. The promisee may by notice to the promisor deprive the third party of the right to performance unless:
(a) the third party has received notice from the promisee that the right has been made irrevocable; or (b) the promisor or the promisee has received notice from the third party that the latter accepts the right.
As will be seen, the principles are couched in fairly broad and general language. How would these provisions apply in the situations already discussed in this paper? Perhaps the only way of testing the matter at the moment is by examination of how liability to third parties in such situations has been treated in other European countries. This can also show some of the lines down which the process of convergence outside the Principles may carry us.
Perhaps the most interesting cases have arisen in France, where third party rights have developed out of a background in the nineteenth century emphasising the principle of privity as pre-eminent, although not to the same extent as in English law. 31 Thus a party who suffers damage as the result of non-performance or misperformance of a contract between two others has a delictual action against the party responsible; there is no "contract-tort fallacy" in French law. In addition there is a contractual claim for the ultimate or latest buyer in a chain of contracts of supply against the original supplier or any subsequent seller in respect of latent defects in the material supplied. This, it has been held, enables the buyer of a house to sue its architect in respect of defects in design. Strictly speaking, this liability is not JQT, since it is not dependent upon the intention of the original contracting parties, but it is nonetheless interesting to compare the approach here with that of the Scottish courts in the who lost the slides. There was an exclusion clause in the contract between CC and P. P sued D in delict. The action was held to be contractual, and that the exclusion clause protected D as well as CC. The court reasoned that where a debtor has sub-contracted performance, the creditor's claim against the substitute debtor is necessarily in contract, and cannot exceed the claim against the principal debtor, while the substitute debtor's liability cannot exceed that which he owes to the principal debtor. In the Paris Airport case, also in 1988, P's aircraft was damaged by a tractor belonging to the airport authority. The accident was a consequence of defects in components of the tractor manufactured by D1 and D2. P, whose contract with the airport authority contained a clause excluding any liability for the latter, sued D1 and D2. It was again held that the action was contractual and not delictual, with the exclusion clause restricting P's claim against the Ds, even though this was not a sub-contract case. The basis of the decision was the "linkage" between Ds' misperformance and that of the airport authority. These two decisions may however be contrasted with the plumbing case, in which A built a house for B with C as a sub-contractor for the plumbing work. B sued C for defects in the plumbing, but this was held to be a delictual claim subject to delictual rather than contractual prescription. § 328 of the German Civil Code (the BGB) gives clear recognition to third party rights in contract. In addition the German courts have developed the concept of "the contract with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties", partly to meet the problem that delictual claims are not available in cases of pure economic loss. Under § 334 of the BGB a debtor can plead against a third party defences available against the principal creditor. In a 1971 case, a contract between an employer and a main contractor contained an exemption clause regarding the latter's use of the employer's plant and equipment on site. Scaffolding provided by the employer collapsed owing to a hidden defect, causing injury to a sub-contractor and its work-force. It was held that the effects of the exclusion clause extended to the third party sub-contractor and its workforce, who could not sue the employer as a result.
I do not intend to suggest that there are any immediate or very precise lessons to be learned from these brief overviews of some French and German cases, or that our convergent European future will necessarily lead us down the chains of reasoning with which the French and German courts have supported their decisions. But it is important to realise that problems like the ones we face in this country have already been addressed elsewhere. I find it significant that other systems have for the most part dealt with these problems by way of contract rather than delict. True, that choice of solution was dictated to some extent by casuistic avoidance of the awkward consequences of other rules in the system concerned: in France, the different rules about exclusion clauses in contractual and delictual claims, in Germany, the non-recoverability of economic loss in delict. But there are also underlying ideas that, where issues about liability arise against a contractual background, the proper start point of legal analysis is in the contract or contracts concerned. We need also to gain a better understanding of the idea that contractual liability extends beyond that of the contracting parties. For too long in Scotland lawyers' thinking has been dominated by the belief that the English rule of privity represents a norm against which our own doctrine of JQT is to be seen as but a limited exception. The perspective is transformed if we extend the picture into Europe; we are dealing with contract law, and contract law in the wide sense in which Scots law has traditionally understood it.
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ThereisadifferenceinthattheGermanrulesapplyonlytoguaranteesexpresslygiveninthecontract, whereastheFrenchrulesapplytothestatutoryguaranteesagainstlatentdefects-inUKterminology,the termsimpliedbylaw. 
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